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LEGAL TURBULENCE: THE COURT’S
MISCONSTRUAL OF THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT’S PREEMPTION
CLAUSE AND THE EFFECT ON
PASSENGERS’ RIGHTS
DANIEL H. ROSENTHAL
INTRODUCTION
The date was January 2, 1999. A large snowstorm had slammed
into Detroit that afternoon, stranding a number of Northwest Airlines
airplanes on snow-covered taxiways and tarmacs.1 Many of the more
than 7000 passengers returning from New Year’s vacations could not
deplane.2 Some waited as many as eleven hours.3 Few of the planes
contained enough food and beverages for the affected passengers,
and many had overflowing toilets.4 The airport closed, but Northwest
continued to hope the planes would depart, despite the contrary pleas
of its on-site managers.5 Even after every other airline had shut down
its operations, Northwest’s planes remained on the taxiways.6 When
Northwest finally reversed its decision and tried to unload the pas-
sengers, it found that there were not enough accessible gates for all of
the planes.7
Copyright © 2002 by Daniel H. Rosenthal.
1. Susan Carey, Northwest Agrees to Pay $7.1 Million to Passengers Stranded in 1999 Bliz-
zard, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2001, at B13.
2. Id.
3. Airline to Pay $7.1 Million for Delay, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 10,
2001, at A11 (detailing the wait time, lack of food, and overflowing toilets that Northwest pas-
sengers experienced during the snowstorm delay of January 2–3, 1999).
4. Id.
5. Northwest Airlines Fails to Block Suit Over 1999 Snowstorm, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 29,
2000 [hereinafter Northwest Airlines].
6. Id.
7. See Steve Twomey, On a Runway to Nowhere on a Snowy Day in Detroit, WASH. POST,
Jan. 29, 1999, at A1 (describing the scene as “The Great Wait of Jan. 2 and 3”).
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The result was a traveler’s worst nightmare. Imprisoned against
their will, the passengers seemingly lacked basic rights. As one ob-
server commented, the “Great Wait . . . gave passengers used to living
in a mobile society a dose of a little-appreciated reality: Once your
flight leaves the gate, your life is not your own. The airline rules.”8 A
few weeks after the incident, some passengers received free vouchers
to travel on Northwest.9 For many of them, however, that was not
enough. Several of the passengers brought tort complaints against the
airline in state court.10 The airline responded by claiming that the
Airline Deregulation Act11 preempted the state law claims since the
grievances were related to its service.12 Finally, two years later, the
parties reached agreement on a $7.1 million settlement.13 In plaintiffs’
lawyer Lawrence Charfoos’s words, the settlement produced a
“flashing-red-light message to airline management that passengers do
have rights.”14
Despite the plaintiffs’ success in this egregious case, the scope of
passengers’ legally actionable rights remains a hotly debated topic. In
early 2001, after two summers of disorder, the public’s opinion of the
commercial aviation industry reached an all-time low.15 In response,
Congress held a series of hearings and threatened to approve a robust
passenger rights bill despite industry lobbying efforts.16 Then, on Sep-
tember 11, terrorists used airplanes to attack the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, and Congressional debate shifted to airport secu-
rity and safety concerns.17 Congress immediately acted to indemnify
8. Id.
9. Carey, supra note 1, at B13.
10. Id.
11. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). Although the Supreme Court refers to the De-
regulation Act as the ADA, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992), I
will refer to the statute as the Deregulation Act to avoid confusion with the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
12. Northwest Airlines, supra note 5. All claims of passengers bound for destinations out-
side of United States borders initially came under Warsaw Convention auspices. Carey, supra
note 1, at B13; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
13. Carey, supra note 1, at B13.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 23–52 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Mac Daniel, U.S. to Aid Logan Security Efforts Program to Fund Technology
Upgrade, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2002, at B4 (describing the steps the federal government has
taken to improve airport security); Joe Sharkey, Despite Federal Rules, the Airlines are Still
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the airline industry from civil liability for personal and property dam-
ages resulting from the violence.18 It also approved legislation to reju-
venate the crippled airline industry via a package of financial com-
pensation and loan guarantees.19
More than six months after the horrific attacks, as airlines have
altered business plans and cut flights in the race to reorganize prof-
itably,20 passengers’ lack of rights has again resurfaced as a serious
problem.21 This Note addresses the appropriate scope of passenger
rights from several different perspectives. Part I details how airlines
increasingly victimize passengers and take advantage of a lack of in-
centives to remedy serious deficiencies. Part I also identifies the De-
regulation Act’s preemption clause as the source of airlines’ defense
to otherwise viable tort claims. Part II examines the body of law in-
terpreting the Deregulation Act’s preemption clause and concludes
that passengers lack both state and federal remedies to most tortious
conduct by airlines. In analyzing this jurisprudence, Part II argues
that the Court’s interpretation of the Deregulation Act is inconsistent
with its preemption clause decisions rendered more recently under
other statutes. Specifically, it draws parallels to the Court’s decision in
a recent case involving the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act’s preemption clause.22 Finally, this Note concludes that the Court
must narrow the Deregulation Act’s preemptive scope and provide
passengers with a remedy to actionable conduct by the airlines.
I.  THE PROBLEM
Everyone has experienced it—that moment when the blood
starts to boil, the lungs start to choke on recycled air, and movement
Finding Ways to Speed Favored Passengers to Their Flights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at C2
(discussing the overall improvement in airport security since the September 11 attacks).
18. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408, 115
Stat. 230, 240–41 (2001).
19. Id. § 101, 115 Stat. at 230.
20. See, e.g., Cynthia Wilson, Airlines Need Return of Business Flier, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 2002, at C1 (describing how airlines are adapting to the post–September 11
travel world).
21. See, e.g., Bruce Mohl, What About When the Airlines Render You Nearly Insensible?,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2002, at M11 (discussing the problem of passenger rights, but recog-
nizing that “in the wake of Sept. 11 . . . fears about security far outweigh concerns about cus-
tomer service”); Susan Stellin, Those Uncertain Air Connections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 5,
at 4 (detailing the poor customer service that continues in post–September 11 travel).
22. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867–74 (2000) (analyzing the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act under both express and implied preemption doctrines).
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is restricted because the unpleasant individual in the next seat starts
to occupy more than his fair space. Such is life on an airplane these
days. Airline-passenger relations have degenerated into an atmos-
phere of disorganization and blame. One recent survey placed cus-
tomer satisfaction with airlines on the same low level as satisfaction
with trial lawyers, ahead of only satisfaction with cable television
companies and commercial diet programs.23
Between 1995 and 1999, flight delays soared by a remarkable 58
percent and cancellations increased by 68 percent, according to Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) statistics.24 At the same time, to-
tal flight operations grew by a mere 8.3 percent.25 Congress reacted to
rising passenger complaints in the fall of 1999. Initially, Congress
chose simply to include passenger rights elements in its funding bill
for the Department of Transportation (DOT).26 Hoping to fend off
more expansive passenger rights legislation, the major airlines27 vol-
untarily agreed to submit customer service initiatives to Congress and
the DOT.28 Each airline proposed a series of areas in which they
would work to improve services for their customers.29
Unfortunately, none of the initiatives had any chance to produce
real change.30 For instance, both United Airlines and US Airways in-
cluded language in their plans promising to “provide on-time baggage
delivery.”31 The combination of such broad language and the lack of
23. James R. Asker, Why Are Passengers So Angry at Carriers?, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 25, 1999, at 50, 52 (citing a survey by the Consumer Union of the United States).
24. Paul Mann, Airlines Treat Patrons ‘Like Cattle,’ Feds Say, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 7, 2000, at 52, 52 (reporting FAA statistics that show staggering increases in the
numbers of delays and cancellations, and in the length of delays).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., House Backs $10.1 Billion FAA Funding, Passenger Rights, AVIATION DAILY,
Oct. 4, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter House Backs Passenger Rights] (detailing the congressional con-
ference report on the transportation funding bill that included money to address customer serv-
ice complaints).
27. This terminology is commonly used to describe United Airlines, American Airlines,
Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, Continental Airlines, US Airways, and America West
Airlines. Trans World Airlines was a member of this group until it was purchased by American
Airlines in January 2001.
28. U.S. Carriers Debut Customer Service Plans, but Congress is Skeptical, AVIATION
DAILY, Sept. 16, 1999, at 1.
29. Id.
30. In 1999, airlines limited the size and number of carry-on bags, charged higher penalty
fees for ticket changes, and failed to provide timely information about a rising number of delays.
E.g., Study Finds Airline Service in Decline, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 17, 2000, at
76, 76 [hereinafter Airline Service Decline].
31. Id.
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an enforcement mechanism rendered these initiatives ineffective.32
Passenger complaints doubled again within the year.33 Flight delays
continued to increase 12 percent faster in the first five months of 2000
than in the same period in 1999.34 Indeed, in the twelve months fol-
lowing the airlines’ voluntary promises, flight delays cost business
travelers 5 billion dollars and 1.5 million hours.35 This amount
prompted National Business Travel Association Executive Director
Marianne McInerney to conclude that “[w]e are at a point where our
nation’s airline system is in need of triage.”36
Gradually, the congressional leadership began to use sharp
rhetoric when critiquing the airlines. Former House Budget Commit-
tee Chairman John Kasich called the airlines “terrible.”37 He added
that “they’re not responsive, they’re monopolistic, and the customer
comes last.”38 Nevertheless, the airline industry was still able to thwart
congressional efforts to approve regulatory passenger rights legisla-
tion.39
32. Id.; Paul Mann, Passenger Rights Movement Expected to Bounce Back, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 25, 1999, at 54, 54 (recognizing the complaint of Congressman John D.
Dingell that little in the airlines’ initiatives was enforceable in any real manner); see also Bruce
D. Nordwall, Airline Service Shortfalls Detailed in IG Report, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
July 3, 2000, at 31, 31 (summarizing a DOT report that concluded that “airlines have a ways to
go to restore customer confidence”).
33. Mann, supra note 24, at 52; see also Asker, supra note 23, at 50 (detailing the number of
formal DOT complaints by angered passengers from September 1998 to August 1999).
34. Mann, supra note 24, at 52 (citing a flight delay study done by DOT Inspector General
Kenneth M. Mead); see also Airline Service Decline, supra note 30, at 76 (reporting that the an-
nual Airline Quality Rating numbers had fallen dramatically in 1999 due to a steep rise in cus-
tomer complaints).
35. Paul Mann, Lawmakers Puzzle Over Passenger Rights Bill, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 18, 2000, at 59, 59 (detailing figures compiled by the National Business Travel As-
sociation); see also Robert W. Moorman, Summoned by Slater, Airlines Vow to Improve,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 28, 2000, at 54, 54–55 (focusing on a summit between the
DOT and the major airlines to evaluate the voluntary plans and to develop new service initia-
tives).
36. Mann, supra note 35, at 59.
37. Id. at 60.
38. Id.
39. E.g., Airlines Give $1 Million to Political Campaigns in First Half, AVIATION DAILY,
Sept. 1, 1999, at 2 (describing the flurry of lobbying activity by the airline industry to deter the
efforts of passenger rights advocates). Moreover, no organized consumer effort exists to call at-
tention to problems in the aviation industry. Instead, most of the efforts are at the grassroots
level. Asker, supra note 23, at 50; see also United Airlines, at http://www.united.com (last visited
Mar. 31, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (presenting a web site that collects customer
complaints from United Airlines travelers).
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Recognizing that the airlines were not the only culprits responsi-
ble for passenger dissatisfaction, Congress also looked at FAA disor-
ganization and air-traffic control problems that contributed to de-
lays.40 For the purposes of this Note, however, the airlines themselves
remain at least partially to blame because they sometimes behave in
ways that would create state tort and contract law causes of action but
for the existence of the Deregulation Act. The examples below high-
light such potentially actionable conduct.
A. Flight Delays & Cancellations
Every day, passengers experience flight delays or cancellations
for myriad reasons.41 Some delays and cancellations may even breach
the contract between the airline and the passenger. Consider the fol-
lowing scenario. On August 4, 2000, United Airlines’s overnight flight
from Washington, D.C., to Paris sat on the ground for several hours
before the airline cancelled it for “mechanical reasons.”42 However,
published reports later indicated that the cancellation had nothing to
do with a mechanical defect on the aircraft; United pilots had just re-
fused to take off because former United Chairman Stephen Wolf was
a passenger on the flight.43 This action was clearly not one of the
specified instances in which the United Airlines carrier contract per-
mitted United to refuse to transport a passenger that had bought a
40. E.g., Laurence Zuckerman & Matthew L. Wald, Crisis for Air Traffic System: More
Passengers, More Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2000, at A1 (outlining the different entities re-
sponsible for airline delays and cancellations not related to acts of God, including the airlines,
the FAA, and the nation’s air traffic control system).
41. When this happens, it does not help that airlines often do not divulge the reason for the
delay. Under their nonbinding customer service rules, airlines are under no obligation to inform
consumers of the truthful reason behind any cancellation. Fitzgerald Calls on Airlines to ‘Be
Straight’ with Customers About Delays and Cancellations, PR NEWSWIRE July 13, 2001, at 1.
While this Note does not explore specific state law claims against the aviation industry, there is
sufficient evidence that the airlines have taken advantage of the preemption clause’s protections
from liability.
Another customer service problem regularly occurs when airline representatives do not
provide customers with truthful communications and updates. Mann, supra note 24, at 52 (re-
porting the comments of Senator Frank Lautenberg that, “‘[a]t a minimum, [passengers] don’t
want to be lied to [by the airlines]’”). To help alleviate this concern, most potential versions of
passenger rights bills would require airlines to be truthful in their communications with passen-
gers. Mann, supra note 35, at 59. Unfortunately, enforcement of this goal would be extremely
difficult. Id. (detailing the legislative battles over passenger rights).
42. Robert W. Moorman, United Airlines’ Flight Into Unfriendly Skies, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 14, 2000, at 42, 43 (describing the Wolf story and the impact of labor trou-
bles on flight schedules).
43. Id.
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ticket.44 Yet, for reasons I explain below, hundreds of passengers were
left with no viable remedy.
B. Negligent Provision of Alcohol
Imagine a bar that continues to serve alcohol to a clearly intoxi-
cated and belligerent individual. If the drunken individual were to
commit a tort, the injured party might bring suit against the bar under
a negligence theory. Now picture an airplane where the flight atten-
dant continues to serve alcohol to a group of intoxicated first-class
passengers. The drunken passengers insult a fellow passenger. The
victim sues the flight attendant and the airline. The court would reject
her claim (again, for reasons I explain below) because the provision
of alcohol is an airline “service.”45
C. Lost Baggage & Negligent Misrepresentation
A honeymooning couple travels from New York City to An-
guilla. En route, one of their two bags is lost. During repeated tele-
phone calls to track down their bags, the airline’s representatives re-
peatedly tell the couple that the airline knows the location of the bag
and that it is on its way.46 This information is false, and the bags are
never found. The couple sues the airline for fraud, negligent misrep-
resentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. As shown below, they have no remedy
because of the Deregulation Act.47
44. See United Airlines Conditions of Contract: Summary of Incorporated Terms § 5,
UAL.com, at http://www.ual.com/site/primary/0,10017,2671,00.html (Google cache file of web-
site last visited April 30, 2002) (stating that United Airlines can refuse to transport a passenger
if (1) the government has requisitioned space on the flight, (2) the passenger has not complied
with “government travel requirements,” (3) the “passenger’s conduct is disorderly/abusive or
violent or passenger appears to be intoxicated under the influence of drugs or mentally de-
ranged or engages in any action which might jeopardize [flight safety],” or (4) completing the
trip would be dangerous to the passenger’s mental or physical safety) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal). Since the airlines have no obligation to inform passengers of the actual reason for
any delay, see supra note 41 and associated text, the problem described above is made worse by
the fact that passengers are dependent on the airline to inform them that the airline is acting
outside the scope of its contractual authority.
45. The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion on these facts in Harris v. American Airlines,
Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1995).
46. These are the facts of Siben v. American Airlines, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 271, 278–79
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
47. Outside the Deregulation Act’s coverage, however, these passengers still might prevail.
More specifically, the plaintiffs may have a limited remedy under the Warsaw Convention be-
cause they were engaged in international travel (to Anguilla). See Convention for the Unifica-
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According to Judge Guido Calabresi’s famous theory, competi-
tion in the deregulated aviation industry maximizes resource alloca-
tion and promotes good customer service on its own.48 However, ris-
ing customer frustrations49 and an increasing number of airline
mergers50 that effectively reduce the number of competitors suggest
otherwise. While airline delays and customer service complaints de-
creased in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001,51 the un-
derlying problem has resurfaced as passengers return to air travel.52
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EFFORTS: INCONSISTENT
INTERPRETATION AND INSUFFICIENT REMEDIES
Unfortunately, passengers probably have no contractual or tor-
tious recourse against the airlines or their employees. Since the De-
regulation Act’s enactment in 1978, passengers bringing state law
claims based on tort and contract law have often found their claims to
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct.
12, 1929, arts. 1, 18, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, 3018, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1994) [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention] (stating that the Warsaw Convention applies to international air travel
and establishing that “[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in event of the destruc-
tion or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which
caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by air”). To succeed, how-
ever, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the airline could have prevented the loss. See id. art.
20, at 3019 (“The Carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures.”). Even if the plaintiff succeeds, the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Mont-
real Agreement, limits damages to $75,000 unless the plaintiff can establish willful misconduct
by the carrier. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966, reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302, 7302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal
Agreement]. Additionally, the scope of the Warsaw Convention may be quite narrow. In one
case, for example, the defendant airline knowingly sprayed pesticide that made the plaintiff pas-
senger sick, but the action was not considered an “accident.” Therefore, neither the Warsaw
Convention nor the Deregulation Act preempted the plaintiff’s claim. Capacchione v. Qantas
Airways, Ltd., 25 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 17,346, at 17,349 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1996).
48. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL & ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 83
(1971).
49. E.g., Mohl, supra note 21, at M11 (quoting one customer as stating that the airlines do
not hear the consumer “‘at all’”).
50. E.g., David Leonhardt, What Will Deal Mean? Depends on Destination, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2001, at C1 (discussing the American buyout of Trans World Airlines in light of the
proposed merger of United and US Airways).
51. E.g., Stellin, supra note 21, § 5, at 4 (citing a DOT report that found that, due to a de-
creased flight schedule, 84.7% of aircraft arrived on time in November 2001 compared to 72.8%
in November 2000).
52. E.g., Mohl, supra note 21, at M11 (discussing a climate that favored passenger rights in
early 2002).
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be preempted.53 Moreover, these unsuccessful plaintiffs lack any real
federal remedy under the Act. In short, this broad judicial interpreta-
tion of the preemption clause is responsible for the current state of
the airline-passenger relationship.
The Deregulation Act’s preemption clause states: “a State . . .
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation or other provision having
the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier.”54 The Supreme Court has addressed the Act’s preemption
clause twice in the last decade, first in 1992 in Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.55 and then again in 1995 in American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens.56
A. The Supreme Court’s First Try
In Morales, the Court evaluated states’ attorneys general guide-
lines on illicit practices of the air travel industry.57 The attorneys gen-
eral argued that the guidelines did not have the “force and effect” of
law under the preemption clause.58 Instead, they claimed that the
guidelines merely “explain[ed] in detail how existing state laws
appl[ied] to air fare advertising and frequent flyer programs.”59 Addi-
tionally, they contended that the guidelines did not “relate to” airline
routes, rates, or services.60 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the
Court rejected both arguments.61 Eschewing the petitioners’ claim
53. E.g., Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that the Supreme Court has neglected to define a “service” as used in 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1)
(Supp. II 1976) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994))); Travel All Over the World,
Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to preempt a con-
tract claim where the claim concerned a defendant’s self-imposed obligation); Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1995) (defining services broadly but not including food
or beverage provision).
54. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
55. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
56. 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
57. Morales, 504 U.S. at 379. The petitioner Morales was Texas State Attorney General
Dan Morales. He represented the National Association of Attorneys General. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 379; see also Matthew J. Kelly, Comment, Federal Preemption by the Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978: How Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873, 877–78
(2000) (discussing the petitioners’ argument that the guidelines were merely rules detailing how
the various states’ laws applied to fare advertising, flight overbooking, and frequent flyer pro-
grams).
59. Morales, 504 U.S. at 379 (quoting NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AIR
TRAVEL INDUSTRY ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, Introduction (1988)).
60. Id. at 383.
61. Id.; see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (commencing
the analysis with a review of the statute’s plain meaning); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,
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that Congress meant to preempt only a narrow class of claims, the
Court relied upon the plain meaning of the words “relating to” and
held that the Act preempted any state law that had a mere connection
with an airline’s rates, routes, or services.62
The Court next discussed an important precedent in the Court’s
preemption doctrine.63 In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,64 the Supreme
Court had broadly interpreted a preemption clause that included lan-
guage similar to the Deregulation Act’s clause.65 Shaw concerned the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which
preempts state law claims related to employee benefits.66 Although
the Court did carve out some isolated exceptions in its Shaw opin-
ion,67 it found that the “breadth of [the ERISA provision’s] pre-
emptive reach [was] apparent from [its] language.”68 Specifically, the
ERISA clause preempted all state laws “insofar as they . . . relate[d]
to any employee benefit plan.”69 In Morales, the majority opinion fo-
cused on the similar “relating to” phrase in giving great breadth to the
Deregulation Act’s preemption clause.70
The Morales Court also explored the petitioners’ argument based
on the Deregulation Act’s savings clause. The savings clause origi-
nally stated: “[N]othing contained in this [Act] shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by stat-
ute, but the provisions of this [Act] are in addition to such reme-
56–57 (1990) (“Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Con-
gress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its struc-
ture and purpose.”) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983)).
62. Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979) (de-
fining the phrase as “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to
bring into association with or connection with”)).
63. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (focusing on a plain meaning interpretation instead of ex-
ploring the legislative history in any depth).
64. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
65. Id. at 100; see also John T. Houchin, Case Note, Harris v. American Airlines: Flying
Through the Turbulence of Federal Preemption and the Airline Deregulation Act, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 955, 962 (1997) (describing the Court’s broad evaluation of the relevant language that
later became an issue in the Deregulation Act preemption clause cases).
66. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96.
67. Id. at 100–09 (reviewing the breadth of the preemption clause and the few exceptions
proffered by the legislative history).
68. Id.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
70. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
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dies.”71 The Court minimized the savings clause’s importance in
Morales in three ways. First, the Court applied its finding that the
preemption language most specifically demonstrated Congress’s spe-
cific intent.72 Second, Justice Scalia examined the savings clause’s role
and interpreted it as simply a “relic of the pre-[Deregulation Act]/no
pre-emption regime.”73 Applying language from a previous opinion,
the Court held that the preemption clause’s specific language pre-
vailed over the savings clause’s general language.74
Finally, the Court addressed the argument that Deregulation Act
preemption of state law claims would provide undue protections to
airlines.75 Here, the Court attempted to develop a standard whereby
lower courts could interpret the preemption clause’s applicability
consistently. Relying on Shaw, the Court held that “some state ac-
tions may affect airline fares in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner” to invoke Deregulation Act preemption.76
Despite this attempt to develop a standard, the Morales opinion
failed to address clearly whether the preemption clause contained any
limits.77 In dissent, Justice Stevens undertook an exhaustive review of
the Deregulation Act’s legislative history.78 He initially attacked the
majority’s plain language interpretation and found no clear evidence
that Congress had intended such a broad application of the preemp-
71. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976). In 1994, Congress modified this language. Codification of Cer-
tain U.S. Transportation Laws as Title 49, United States Code, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(e), 108
Stat. 745, 1117 (1994). In doing so, Congress expressly clarified that it did not intend any sub-
stantive change. The revised clause simply provides that “[a] remedy under this part is in addi-
tion to any other remedies provided by law.” 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994).
72. Morales, 504 U.S. at 385.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (“[W]e do not believe
Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general saving
clause.”)).
75. Id. at 390–91 (dismissing the petitioners’ concern that even general state laws on gam-
bling and prostitution could not be applied to airlines if the Court held that the Deregulation
Act preempted their claim).
76. Id. at 390.
77. See Houchin, supra note 65, at 973 (“Th[e] chain of claims is endless because virtually
any activity that an airline is associated with can be connected to the airlines’ rates, routes or
services.”).
78. Morales, 504 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Instead of carefully examining the
language, structure, and history of the [Deregulation Act] . . . . the Court disregards established
canons of statutory construction, and gives the [Deregulation Act] pre-emption provision a con-
struction that is neither compelled by its text nor supported by its legislative history.”) (citations
omitted).
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tion clause.79 More specifically, Justice Stevens concluded that Con-
gress had never expressed an interest in preempting common law tort
and contract claims by individuals.80 He also noted that the conferees
had not considered the House’s “relating to” language as being
broader than the Senate version when discussing the Deregulation
Act’s final terms.81
B. Still No Standard: The Supreme Court Tries Again
Three years later, the Court again examined the Deregulation
Act’s preemption clause. Unfortunately, the decision only served to
complicate the preexisting confusion. In Wolens, the respondents
sued following the airline’s unilateral devaluation of their frequent
flyer mileage.82 The respondents brought suit under state law on both
consumer fraud and breach of contract claims.83 The airline immedi-
ately won removal of the case to federal court, where it initially pre-
vailed on preemption grounds.84
Here, the Court’s ultimate decision did not rest completely on
the preemption clause. Instead, the Court distinguished between the
two claims. First, it rejected the state consumer protection action
based on a Morales preemption analysis, concluding that the De-
regulation Act preempted the claim since the state law related to the
airline’s services.85
Nevertheless, the Court allowed the contract claim to proceed. In
its decision, the Court isolated the “enact or enforce any law” lan-
guage in the preemption clause.86 Since the contract claim rested on
obligations undertaken by the airline—and not obligations required
by the state—the Court found no federal preemption.87 The airline
contended that the DOT should serve as the final contract arbiter.88
79. Id. at 420.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 425–26.
82. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
83. Id. at 224–25.
84. Id. at 225.
85. Id. at 229.
86. Id. at 226.
87. Id. at 234–35.
88. Id. at 230–31. This would be a disastrous remedy and the Court appropriately dismissed
the possibility. The DOT has nowhere near the potential to answer customer breach of contract
claims. Moreover, Congress never gave the agency that power, nor do regulations exist to guide
the DOT as a potential arbiter. Sue Haverkos, Note, Crash and Burn—The Airlines’ Preemption
Defense Goes Down in Flames: American Airlines v. Wolens, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1141, 1162
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However, noting that the DOT lacked the resources to accomplish
such a task, and detecting no congressional intent that such a federal
remedy existed, the Court rejected the airline’s argument.89 Commen-
tators soon referred to the rule in this case as the “Wolens exception”
to federal preemption of state law claims.90
III.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION THE WAY IT SHOULD BE
A two-part standard emerged from the Supreme Court’s pre-
emption decisions. First, under Morales, a lower court must examine
the nature of the airline’s conduct to determine if preemption ap-
plies,91 and a court will find preemption if the conduct that gave rise to
the cause of action relates to airline rates, routes, or services.92 Sec-
ond, under Wolens, a lower court must determine whether the alleg-
edly actionable conduct constitutes state regulation or self-imposed
behavior by the airline.93 This standard accords unintended power to
the preemption clause and is inconsistent with other preemption
clause interpretations. In response, the Court should narrow the De-
regulation Act’s preemptive scope to allow more state law claims.
A. The Court’s Interpretation is Inconsistent with the Plain Language
& Legislative History
During the era when Congress regulated the airline industry, the
Federal Aviation Act of 195894 vested federal oversight responsibility
in the Civil Aeronautics Board.95 In 1978, to remove economic restric-
tions that thwarted aviation industry growth, Congress crafted the
(1996) (“The [DOT] has neither the procedures to deal with this type of issue nor the ability to
handle such a large quantity of suits.”).
89. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232. Indeed, the lack of a federal remedy for the aggrieved party
concerned the Court. Id. (“[Congress] indicated no intention to establish, simultaneously [to the
Deregulation Act], a new administrative process for DOT adjudication of private contract dis-
putes.”).
90. E.g., Haverkos, supra note 88, at 1162; Matthew Kelly, supra note 58 at 885; Kyle
Volluz, Comment, The Aftermath of Morales and Wolens, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 1195, 1213
(1997).
91. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992).
92. Id.
93. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233–35.
94. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–44310
(1994)).
95. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); John W. Freeman, State Regulation of Airlines and the De-
regulation Act of 1978, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 747, 750 (1979).
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Deregulation Act.96 The legislative history describes one of the prob-
lems of an overly regulated industry:
Existing law contains no specific provision on the jurisdiction of the
States and the Federal Government over airlines which provide both
intrastate and interstate service. The lack of specific provisions has
created uncertainties and conflicts, including situations in which car-
riers have been required to charge different fares for passengers
traveling between two cities, depending on whether these passengers
were interstate passengers whose fares are regulated by the [Civil
Aeronautics Board] or intrastate passengers, whose fare is regulated
by a State.97
Concerned that the states simply would re-regulate what Con-
gress had chosen to deregulate, the final bill included a preemption
clause.98 The preemption clause’s “rates” and “routes” terminology is
fairly straightforward, and few Deregulation Act challenges dispute
these words’ application. However, the “services” language within the
preemption clause has provoked judicial confusion and inconsis-
tency.99
In the Deregulation Act, Congress neither defined “services” nor
specified the type of state action preempted by the clause.100 Conse-
quently, the courts have had to interpret what Congress meant,101 but
they have had difficulty with the Deregulation Act’s frustratingly
96. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–44310 (1994)); see also, e.g., Kelly, supra note 58, at 877 (“The
[Deregulation Act] allowed the airline industry to enhance competition and removed perceived
onerous economic restrictions placed on airlines by the [Civil Aeronautics Board].”).
97. H. Rep. No. 95-1211, at 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3751–52.
98. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); see also Kelly, supra note 58, at 877–78 (noting congressional
concern about state intervention).
99. See Kelly, supra note 58, at 874–75 (stating that “state law claims have survived pre-
emption in one jurisdiction but have fallen in another”). Generally, for instance, safety-related
negligence claims are not preempted by the Deregulation Act. See, e.g., Trinidad v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff passenger injured by
extreme airline turbulence did not have his negligence claim preempted by the Deregulation
Act).
100. See Kelly, supra note 58, at 874 (noting that “Congress neither defined the term ‘serv-
ices’ for purposes of [Deregulation Act] preemption, nor enumerated the types of state law ac-
tions or claims that fall victim to preemption”); see also Freeman, supra note 95, at 766–69 (at-
tributing Congress’s silence to ignorance rather than intent).
101. The result has been different findings by different courts. Kelly, supra note 58, at 877–
78. For example, in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996), the Texas Su-
preme Court determined that “[c]ommon-law negligence actions to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries do not impinge in any significant way on Congress’s concern [with Deregulation
Act preemption].” Id. at 282.
ROSENTHAL_FIXED.DOC 06/24/02  3:53 PM
2002] LEGAL TURBULENCE 1871
broad language.102 In such situations, it is important to determine
whether Congress had a “clear and manifest” set of goals in enacting
the statute.103
According to the Act, Congress had two basic goals. First, Con-
gress believed that “maximum reliance on competitive market
forces”104 would further “efficiency, innovation, and low prices.”105
Second, Congress wanted to improve the “variety and quality of . . .
air transportation services.”106 The Court cited these objectives in
Morales.107 However, instead, of exploring their meaning, it chose to
interpret the preemption clause’s plain language. Under this strict
constructionist approach, the preemption clause preempts any state
law claim that relates to—or has any “connection” to—an airline’s
rates, routes, or services.108
This broad interpretation remains precedent today. However,
the Deregulation Act’s language and legislative history do not mani-
fest a clear congressional intent to preempt the vast majority of state
law claims, including those individual, high-occurrence claims that
relate to airline negligence or fraud. As the Court has done in the
past, it should look to its preemption clause jurisprudence in other ar-
eas to clarify the Deregulation Act’s breadth.109
B. The Court Should Apply its Recent Narrowing of Preemption in
Other Areas
The Court has not issued an opinion on the Deregulation Act’s
preemption clause since Wolens. Yet in the seven years since the
Wolens decision, the ERISA precedent relied on by the Court in both
102. The savings clause’s existence also has caused courts difficulty in determining Con-
gress’s specific intent with respect to the preemption clause. See Haverkos, supra note 88, at
1146 (explaining the judicial confusion in interpreting the Deregulation Act); see also infra notes
112–127.
103. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).
104. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (1994).
105. Id. § 40101(a)(12)(A).
106. Id. § 40101(a)(12)(B).
107. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
108. Id. at 386 (discussing the Court’s broad interpretation of the “relating to” language).
109. Consider the majority opinion in Morales, which directly applied the Court’s ERISA
holdings to the Deregulation Act context. See id. at 384 (“Since the relevant language of the
[Deregulation Act] is identical [to ERISA], we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard
here [as we did in our ERISA decision].”).
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Morales and Wolens has changed, with narrower precedent having
been established in the commercial areas.
In its recent, post-Wolens, ERISA decisions, the Court increas-
ingly has taken a more thoroughgoing approach in evaluating
whether the federal statute preempts state law claims. As Justice
Souter wrote for the Court in Travelers Insurance, “[w]e simply must
go beyond the unhelpful [statutory] text and the frustrating difficulty
of defining its key [“relate to”] term, and look instead to the objec-
tives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive.”110 The result of this more exten-
sive analysis in the ERISA area is that state laws of general applica-
bility are not preempted where the economic effects on pension and
welfare plans are secondary.111
The Court also has narrowed its preemption jurisprudence in an-
other context. In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,112 the peti-
tioner, a car accident victim, sought damages against an automobile
manufacturer because her car lacked a driver’s side airbag.113 In re-
sponse, Honda argued that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 (“Safety Act”)114 preempted the claim.115 Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, first examined the Safety Act’s pre-
emption clause.116 He found that the provision’s plain language ex-
pressly preempted state regulation of the federal domain of automo-
110. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 656 (1995).
111. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815
(1997) (holding that a state tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment
centers was not preempted by ERISA.); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dilling-
ham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (narrowing the breadth of the “relate to” phrase in
the ERISA context); Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 668 (allowing a generally applicable state sur-
charge statute to survive ERISA preemption).
112. 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding that a “no airbag” tort complaint was not expressly
preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 but was impliedly pre-
empted by other statutes).
113. Id. at 865.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988).
115. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
116. The specific provision read as follows:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter
is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either
to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of mo-
tor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of perform-
ance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal stan-
dard.
15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (repealed in 1994).
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bile safety standards.117 He then considered whether to extend express
preemption to common law tort actions. Initially, Justice Breyer ac-
knowledged that a “broad reading” of the preemption clause might
allow express preemption of the instant claim.118 However, he noted
the existence of a savings clause, similar to that in the Deregulation
Act, within the Safety Act.119 Combining the two principles, the Court
found that express preemption would leave “little, if any, potential li-
ability at common law.”120 Therefore, “few, if any, state tort actions
would remain for the saving[s] clause to save.”121
Lacking a “convincing indication” that Congress intended to
preempt common law tort actions in addition to state regulations, the
Court refused to expressly preempt the claim based on the Safety Act
provision alone.122 Next, the Court considered the Federal Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard 208 (“Safety Standard”).123 The Safety Standard
expressed the DOT’s position on the inclusion of seat belts, airbags,
and other safety devices in manufactured automobiles.124 The Court
found that the DOT intended its comprehensive plan to include a mix
of passive restraint devices.125 Therefore, under federal safety stan-
dards, automobile manufacturers did not have an express duty to in-
stall a particular device, such as a driver’s side airbag.126 Since the peti-
tioner’s tort claim required the finding of a duty that conflicted with
the mix of devices sought by the Safety Standard, the Court found
implied preemption of the claim.127
C. Interpreting Preemption Broadly is Inconsistent with Federalism
Where congressional statutory intent is not “clear and manifest,”
longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence does not interpret a fed-
117. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
118. Id. at 868.
119. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k), which provides that “compliance with” a federal safety
standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under common law”).
120. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 869–74.
123. Id. at 874–75.
124. Geier, 529 U.S. at 877–78 (describing the potential safety hazards of airbags in explain-
ing why the Safety Standard did not require automobile manufacturers to include them); U.S.
DEP’T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD 208 (1994).
125. Geier, 529 U.S. at 878–79.
126. Id. at 880.
127. Id. at 886.
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eral act to supersede the laws of sovereign states.128 In preemption
cases, the Court’s precedent prioritizes federalism concerns. Specifi-
cally, the Court’s preemption analysis “must be guided by respect for
the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our fed-
eralist system.”129 Moreover, the Court begins its analysis in such cases
with a “presum[ption] that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas
of traditional state regulation.”130
In Geier, the Court held that a state law claim was preempted be-
cause it would serve as an “obstacle” to successful completion of an
“important” federal objective.131 The Court referenced World War II–
era precedent to emphasize the important states rights concerns:
There is not—and from the very nature of the problem there cannot
be—any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pat-
tern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Con-
gress. . . . In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear dis-
tinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to determine
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the state]
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.132
This precedent casts grave doubt on the current Court’s rationale
for giving short shrift to states’ rights in Morales and Wolens. The De-
regulation Act’s overarching purpose was to provide the airlines with
the potential for economic growth by deregulating the industry.133
Prior to the Deregulation Act, state and federal laws governed the
pricing and routing of the aviation industry. The House’s intent in the
preemption section, expressed in the final language, was “to make
clear that no state or political subdivision may defeat the purposes of
the bill by regulating interstate air transportation.”134
In the short time since the Supreme Court decided Geier, one
circuit court has cited Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in its evalua-
128. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738–40 (1985) (finding that a presumption against preemp-
tion of state regulations is overcome only by specific congressional intent).
129. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
130. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 740.
131. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
132. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quoted in Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.
133. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
134. Hearings on H.R. 8813 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Pub.
Works and Transp., 95th Cong. 243 (1977).
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tion of a Deregulation Act preemption clause claim. That court, how-
ever, declined to extend Justice Breyer’s opinion to the latter con-
text.135 In reaching this preemption clause decision, the circuit court
refused even to consider the Geier or ERISA decisions,136 writing that
“if developments in pension law have undercut holdings in air-
transportation law, it is for the Supreme Court itself to make the ad-
justment. Our marching orders are clear: follow decisions until the
Supreme Court overrules them.”137
The Court’s expansive reading of the preemption clause in
Morales misunderstands the preemption clause’s original purpose. In
acting to deregulate the aviation industry, Congress intended to pro-
vide more flexibility for airlines to institute lower airfares and new
low-cost services.138 The Act contained a preemption clause to pro-
hibit state governments from regulating that which Congress sought
to deregulate.
Given a legislative history that is at best inconclusive, the
breadth of the Morales decision is surprising.139 Recall Justice Souter’s
language in Travelers Insurance, where, writing for the majority, he
criticized the ERISA statutory text as “unhelpful” and directed the
Court to delve more deeply into Congress’s objective.140 The Court
did not utilize this approach in Morales. Instead, it simply accepted
the dictionary definition of “relate to” and applied the then-existing
ERISA precedent.141
Morales and Wolens do not adhere to congressional intent.
Moreover, in the last seven years, the two decisions have been iso-
lated from similar cases interpreting other statutes’ preemption
135. United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 607–08 (7th Cir. 2000).
136. See supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
137. Mesa Airlines, 219 F.3d at 608 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
138. E.g., Freeman, supra note 95, at 747.
139. Moreover, in an era where the defense of states’ rights has become a hallmark of the
Rehnquist Court, the Deregulation Act preemption issues have produced strange bedfellows
among the Justices. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992), Justice Scalia
authored the majority opinion, while Chief Justice Rehnquist, perhaps the greatest champion of
states’ rights on the Court, joined the Morales dissent written by Justice Stevens. Id. at 419
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 656 (1995).
141. Justice Scalia’s approach should not surprise given his preference for plain meaning
and his distrust of legislative history. For a general explanation of his views, see ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY 36
(1997).
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clauses.142 Given the many similarities among these cases, the Court
does not need to look far to reform its Deregulation Act interpreta-
tion. The Court’s holding in Geier provides an appropriate framework
for clarifying the growing body of law surrounding the Deregulation
Act’s preemption clause. Applying Geier in the Deregulation Act
context would restore both meaning to the Act’s savings clause and
lawmaking authority to the states. As a result, individual common law
tort and contract actions would be decided differently than would di-
rect attempts by states to regulate the airline industry.
CONCLUSION
The societal and legal turbulence described in this Note results
from varying interpretations of the Deregulation Act’s preemption
clause. Passengers who feel victimized by airline industry acts that
would constitute common law torts and breaches of contract are left
with inadequate remedies. Unfortunately, the potentially actionable
behavior continues because the airline industry faces no legal incen-
tive to improve.143 Consider that on January 2, 2002, three years to the
day after Northwest kept its passengers on airplanes for up to eleven
hours, Delta Airlines did virtually the same thing to some of its cus-
tomers during an Atlanta snowstorm.144 Referring to the airlines’ gen-
eral, voluntary effort to improve customer service,145 one aggrieved
passenger commented that she did not sense any improvement:
“‘Delta’s attitude was,’” she said, “‘like, “[Expletive] you, you’re on
our plane.”’”146
142. To ignore the ERISA pension and welfare cases, see supra notes 110-127 and accompa-
nying text, is irresponsible given the Court’s reliance on Shaw in its Morales decision.
143. Perhaps one expert says it best: “‘I’m really tired of hearing [airlines place blame for
delays elsewhere]. Airlines blame the FAA, and what they can’t blame on the FAA they blame
on God.’” Asker, supra note 23, at 50 (quoting Brent Bowen, director of the University of Ne-
braska Aviation Institute). For one such industry perspective, see Back-Door Re-Regulation
Threatens Industry, Jeanniot Says, AVIATION DAILY, June 7, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter Re-
Regulation] (describing how passengers hold the airlines accountable even when the delay is due
to air traffic control or weather problems). In Europe, plans have been discussed to penalize
airlines for flight delays within their control. EC to Propose Paying Passengers for Excessive
Delays, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 29, 2000, at 5.
144. Mohl, supra note 21, at M11 (describing a ten-hour ordeal for passengers on a Delta
flight from Atlanta to Boston, one of approximately twenty flights that were delayed on the
ground for more than six hours).
145. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
146. Mohl, supra note 21, at M11 (quoting Allison Gilbert-Kubiak, a passenger on the Delta
flight from Atlanta to Boston).
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Although Congress intended to protect the aviation industry
from state deregulation,147 there is little evidence that Congress in-
tended to preempt common law claims that do not directly attempt to
regulate the economics of the industry. The potentially actionable
conduct described in this Note demonstrates the scope of the problem
and illustrates that passengers lack an effective remedy. Nevertheless,
the preemption clause does serve an important purpose. Complete
elimination of the preemption clause would open the aviation indus-
try up to the dangers of re-regulation.148 Therefore, the key question is
where to draw the line.
Given this difficulty—combined with a worsening airline-
passenger relationship—something must change. Ideally, the Court
should correct its Morales error by extending the logic of its other
preemption clause cases to the Deregulation Act context. A court
confronted with a Deregulation Act preemption claim should under-
take a two-part inquiry, beginning with an express preemption analy-
sis. Under this approach, any claim that expressly intends to regulate
the economic workings of the aviation industry would be preempted.
Claims that deal with routes or rates, or where concurrent regulation
is problematic, would be preempted. This would prevent states from
setting fares for interstate travel, one of Congress’s main fears when it
deregulated the industry.
If a court failed to find express preemption, then it would under-
take an implied preemption analysis similar to the analysis in Geier.
Here, a court would look to DOT and FAA standards to determine if
the plaintiff’s claim conflicted with federal objectives. Any conflict
would require preemption of the claim. However, a claim that did not
conflict with federal standards would survive preemption. This two-
step process would ensure protection of the aviation industry as Con-
gress clearly intended. Additionally, passengers would have at least
147. The legislative reaction to September 11 demonstrates that even Congress recognizes
the lack of clarity in this area. Shortly after the terrorist attacks, Congress took immediate ac-
tions to indemnify every layer of the airline industry against civil liability for damages resulting
from the attacks. H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. § 408 (2001). In doing so, Congress formally pre-
empted state tort claims against American Airlines and United Airlines—proprietors of the four
aircraft involved in the attacks—rather than rely on an interpretation of the Deregulation Act.
Id. This action demonstrates how a workable preemption clause could prevent claims in unfore-
seen, high-damage situations, while still holding airlines accountable for the low-damage torts
that occur on a regular basis.
148. See Re-Regulation, supra note 143, at 5 (“The greatest threat confronting the [aviation]
industry today is back-door re-regulation, according to [International Association of Travel
Agents] Director General Pierre Jeanniot.”).
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some measure of recourse through common law actions. The new en-
vironment would provide airlines with the incentive to respect pas-
senger rights without destroying the industry’s viability.
The longer the Court waits to intervene, the more passenger dis-
satisfaction will rise.149 Over the next decade, infrastructure limitations
and competitive markets that produce overcrowding of planes could
exacerbate the situation. Heightened airline security and continued
terrorist concerns will also not make flying any easier. As one indus-
try expert has noted, every day at airports could “‘look like the
Wednesday before Thanksgiving.’”150
Even defenders of the Court’s expansive reading of the Deregu-
lation Act’s preemption clause would acknowledge that Congress did
not intend such a result.
149. Unless and until the Court clarifies the preemption clause issue, an aggrieved passenger
probably should carefully consider the type of claim he or she wishes to file. Much of the juris-
prudence surrounding the Deregulation Act’s preemption clause involves two types of common
law claims. In a tort action, the plaintiff has a high burden to carry to escape preemption of his
or her claim. Only where the link to an airline’s prices, routes, or services, is extremely tenuous
does the plaintiff have a chance. Conversely, under the Wolens exception, a significant number
of breach of contract claims can survive preemption. E.g., Haverkos, supra note 88, at 1160
(“[I]f a common-law breach of contract claim, where the result is limited to the terms of the con-
tract, is not preserved under the [Deregulation Act’s] savings clause, it seems that no state cause
of action that somehow relates to airline rates, routes, or services would survive [Deregulation
Act] preemption.”). However, given contract damage principles, the benefits of winning a
breach of contract claim may be so insignificant as to not justify a plaintiff’s time and resources.
150. Airline Service Decline, supra note 30, at 76 (quoting Dean Headley, Associate Profes-
sor of Marketing, Wichita State University School of Business, and collaborator on the Airline
Quality Rating annual survey).
